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Rashkover: Justification for Police Intrusions

JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICE INTRUSIONS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Loretta1
(decided June 18, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Delbart Loretta was convicted of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree.2 Loretta was observed placing an aluminum foil object in his pocket, which was subsequently
determined to be drugs.3 The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, in denying Loretta’s suppression motion, held that the police conduct “constituted a level-two commonlaw inquiry,”4 based upon Loretta’s nervous mannerisms, the fact that
the stop was within a “drug-prone neighborhood,” and Loretta’s attempt to block the officers’ view of his pocket.5 Accompanying a
lawful level two common law inquiry is the officers’ right to “ask[ ]
more pointed questions.”6 In other words, the officers may ask questions in an effort to “gain explanatory information.”7
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The arresting detective observed Loretta placing what the officer believed was drug packaging into his shirt pocket. 8 The detective, recognizing he was located within a “drug-prone neighborhood,”
1

People v. Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013).
Id. at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
People v. Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013).
7
Tillie S. Mirman, Search and Seizure: New York vs. Federal Approach, 28 TOURO L.
REV. 751, 757 (2012).
8
Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
2
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Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 13

1102

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

had reason to believe that the aluminum foil object that Loretta
placed into his shirt pocket was drug paraphernalia.9 Two police officers surrounded Loretta, and the arresting detective approached
him.10 Loretta, upon the detective’s approach, immediately began
exhibiting nervous mannerisms.11 It appeared that Loretta was also
strategically using his hand to block the officers’ view of the pocket
in which he had placed the aluminum foil.12 At this point, the detective, with great suspicion, told Loretta to stop moving his hand and
asked him “if he had anything illegal or what he had in his pocket.”13
The officers found drugs in Loretta’s possession, and he was later
convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth
degree.14
III.

REASONING
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.15
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. De Bour,16 interpreted
the Fourth Amendment and established a four-tier method to determine the constitutionality of police encounters and confrontations.17
With each successive level, the officers may legally increase the level
of intensity of their intrusions.18 As the levels progress, the require-

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 571-72.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/13

2

Rashkover: Justification for Police Intrusions

2014]

JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICE INTRUSIONS

1103

ments the officers must fulfill become more stringent.19
In short, the court in Loretta held that the officers’ conduct
constituted a level-two inquiry.20 The court reached its conclusion by
distinguishing People v. Garcia.21 In Garcia, three officers pulled
over the defendant’s vehicle after they observed a defect in the rear
brake light.22 In total, there were five occupants in the vehicle.23
When the officers approached the vehicle, “the three passengers in
the rear seats ‘were a little furtive,’ kept ‘looking behind,’ [] ‘stiffened up,’ . . . and ‘acted nervous.’ ”24 Following these observations,
one of the officers asked the occupants if anyone in the vehicle had
any weapons.25 One of the occupants responded and presented a
knife.26 The officers then requested that the occupants exit the vehicle, and the occupants complied.27 Following their exit, one of the
officers spotted what he believed was “a gun or some sort of weapon”
between the seats.28 The officers then searched the entire vehicle and
found another weapon in the trunk.29 Subsequently, the weapons
were determined to be only air-powered guns.30
The court in Garcia held that the defendant’s conduct did not
justify the actions the officer took under a level-two inquiry.31 The
court believed that nervous mannerisms were not uncommon upon a
police stop.32 In Loretta, however, the court found justification for a
level-two inquiry by combining Loretta’s nervous characteristics with
more telling circumstances, such as his location within a drug prone
neighborhood and his attempt to block the officers’ sight of what was
subsequently found to be drug packaging.33

19
Id. The requirements of each tier are discussed in detail later within this note. See infra
section V.A.3.i.
20
Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
21
Id. at 1-2; People v. Garcia, 983 N.E.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. 2012).
22
Garcia, 983 N.E.2d at 260.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Garcia, 983 N.E.2d at 260.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Garcia, 983 N.E.2d at 263.
33
Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
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FEDERAL APPROACH

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects persons against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”34 Typically, a search and seizure will violate the Fourth Amendment unless
it is “based on probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.”35
The Supreme Court, however, has crafted certain exceptions to the
probable cause and warrant requirement.36
A.

Terry v. Ohio

In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio,37 recognized
that some encounters between officers and persons are not seizures.38
A forcible seizure occurs when an officer confronts an individual and
deprives him of his ability to walk away.39 In Terry, Officer Martin
McFadden observed two men, John Terry and Richard Chilton,
standing on a street corner, acting in a way the officer believed was
suspicious.40 McFadden watched as Terry and Chilton walked back
and forth, always on the same route, peering into a store window.41
Terry and Chilton repeated this pattern multiple times.42 Eventually,
a third man, Katz, approached and had a brief conversation with both
Terry and Chilton.43 At this point, Officer McFadden suspected both
men of “casing a job [for] a stick-up.”44 He proceeded to follow Terry and Chilton until they rejoined Katz a few blocks from the store.45
Officer McFadden approached all three men, identified himself, and asked for their names.46 After the men “mumbled something,” the officer patted Terry down and felt a pistol.47 He then or34

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures (Warrantless I), 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 46 (2012).
36
Id.
37
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38
Id. at 16.
39
Id. at 16.
40
Id. at 5.
41
Id. at 5-6.
42
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 6-7.
47
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
35
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dered all three men into a nearby store, removed Terry’s overcoat,
and recovered the pistol.48
The Supreme Court, in Terry, held that government interests,
such as “crime prevention and detection,”49 justify “brief investigatory stops”50 that are not seizures51 and, therefore, are based on “less
than probable cause.”52 “[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’ . .
. .”53 Reasonable suspicion demands “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the
level of suspicion required for probable cause.”54
Generally, courts have required reasonable suspicion to be objectively reasonable.55 Courts have been very lenient and typically
defer “to the observations and conclusions of the police, reasoning
that an experienced officer can infer criminal activity from conduct
that may seem innocuous to a lay observer.”56 However, when a
court does find it necessary to review reasonable suspicion determinations, it shall look at the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the officer had “particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting criminal activity.57 Even activities and circumstances that
alone would not appear suspicious must be reviewed, as a combination of “innocent activities may cumulatively create reasonable suspicion.”58
Along with investigatory stops, the Supreme Court, in Terry,
also recognized the power of an officer to conduct a warrantless
search.59 Like investigatory stops, the Supreme Court found that
government interests, such as “the need for law enforcement officers
to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence,” jus-

48

Id.
Id. at 22.
50
Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 47.
51
Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
52
Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 47.
53
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
54
Id. at 2.
55
Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 48.
56
Id. at 51-52.
57
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
58
Warrantless Searches and Seizures (Warrantless II), 90 GEO. L.J. 1130, 1134-35
(2002).
59
2 Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 4:41 (3d 2013).
49
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tify frisks absent probable cause.60 Evidence found as a result of the
frisk cannot be used to prove the existence of reasonable suspicion.61
Similar to the rule for investigatory stops, “[t]he standard for
determining the need for a protective frisk is an objective one.”62
This is because courts believe that subjective beliefs “have too little
substance to effectively guarantee protection of constitutional
rights.”63 While an officer does not need to be certain that a person is
armed or dangerous, a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances should conclude, like the officer, “that his or her safety or
that of others was in danger . . . .”64 Because an officer’s life is potentially at stake, courts have routinely kept the “test [for] sufficient
suspicion” at a low threshold.65
V.

NEW YORK STATE APPROACH

The New York State Constitution protects persons from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”66 The four-tier approach to evaluate police encounters with civilians,67 established by the New York
Court of Appeals, is a product of over forty years of case law.
A.

New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law: How it Shaped
New York’s Current Search and Seizure
Framework

The New York Stop and Frisk law became effective July 1,
1964.68 Following its most recent amendment in 2010, the statute,
titled “Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for
weapons,” reads:
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article
for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer
60

Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures Arrests and Confessions § 13:34 (2d. 2013).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
67
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72; People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 2004);
People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205-06 (N.Y. 1992).
68
Criminal Law—New York Authorizes Police to “Stop-and-Frisk” on Reasonable Suspicion—N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, Ch. 86, § 2, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180(a)., 78 HARV. L. REV.
473 (1964) [hereinafter New York Authorizes Police].
61
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may stop a person in a public place located within the
geographical area of such officer’s employment when
he reasonably suspects that such person is committing,
has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and
may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. [Irrelevant to this discussion;
deals with court officers] 3. When upon stopping a
person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions
one and two a police officer or court officer, as the
case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger
of physical injury, he may search such person for a
deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance
readily capable of causing serious physical injury and
of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by lawabiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he
reasonably believes may constitute the commission of
a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
4. [Irrelevant to this discussion; deals with storage and
maintenance of data]69
In short, the law permits a police officer to approach a person and ask
investigatory questions when the officer has “specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”70 Furthermore, a police officer
“who ‘reasonably suspects’ that he is in ‘danger of life or limb[,]’
may search the suspect for a dangerous weapon.”71
1.

Passage of New York’s Stop and Frisk Law

At the request of the New York City Police Department,72 the
stop and frisk bill was sponsored and submitted by the Mayor’s Leg-

69

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2013).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
71
New York Authorizes Police, supra note 68, at 473.
72
John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law, 33
FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 212 (1964).
70
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islative representative, Julius Volker.73 The Bill was passed in 1964
because case law was filled with conflicting theories and conclusions
as to whether an arrest was made or whether “the process of investigation was still underway.”74 One theory was that “[a]s soon as the
defendant [believed] that his liberty [was] constrained, there [was] an
arrest.”75 This theory led to a conflict between courts.76 Some courts
favored the police department, finding that at nearly all times, probable cause existed, justifying an arrest.77 Other courts took a more
conservative view, finding that in most instances, no probable cause
existed, therefore, leading to illegal arrests78 and suppression of evidence.79
The conflicting theory “recognize[d] the possibility of a period of investigation and indicate[d] that it is the operation of the arresting officer’s mind which determine[d] whether there was a temporary detention or an arrest and the precise moment of the arrest.”80
As a result, this theory relied on an officer’s subjective belief of
probable cause based on the facts, circumstances, and situation.81
Although given less weight, a second reason for the passage
of the bill was its presentation as a “measure [] necessary to prevent
crime.”82 Volker stated, “the police are charged with the duty not on73

Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s
Investigative Stops, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 542 (2012).
74
Ronayne, supra note 72, at 212.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 183 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1962) (holding that the officer’s
observation of four men handing money to the defendant was not indicative of a crime being
committed and therefore led to an illegal arrest); People v. O’Connor, 178 N.E. 762, 762
(1931) (holding that the arrest was made illegally because the officer had no right to search
the prisoner, nor did the prisoner resist the officer or commit a crime).
79
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 542. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”); People v. Loria, 179 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1961) (“[The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects] against ‘unreasonable governmental intrusion’ into the privacy of a person’s home, and any evidence discovered as a result of such an
intrusion is now constitutionally tainted and inadmissible in a State court.”); People v.
Brown, 225 N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (1962) (holding that the arrest of the defendant was illegal
because the officer did not know that the defendant had committed a burglary, nor the commission of any felony, and therefore anything revealed by the search after the arrest may not
be utilized against the defendant).
80
Ronayne, supra note 72, at 212-13.
81
Id. at 213.
82
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 543.
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ly of arresting criminals, but, equally, if not more important, of preventing crime and preserving the peace.”83
Predicting that the bill would draw scrutiny as potentially violating the Fourth Amendment, Volker argued that the bill required a
“reasonable-man test.”84 In other words, Volker argued that the bill
should avoid a constitutional challenge because the “detaining, questioning, and search” must be based on “reasonable grounds.”85 He
further attempted to avoid a constitutional challenge by clarifying
that the contemplated “average period of questioning a person would
be no more than a few minutes.”86
2.

Early Challenges to New York’s Stop and
Frisk Law

During the Supreme Court’s 1967 term, the Court heard three
cases in which it considered “the extent to which police may ‘seize’
and ‘search’ persons without a warrant.”87 The first case, Terry v.
Ohio, is discussed in detail in the above sections of this note.88
Sibron v. New York,89 and its companion case, Peters v. New York,90
both failed to strike down New York’s Stop and Frisk law.91
In Sibron, a police officer observed the defendant from 4:00
P.M. to midnight converse with “six or eight persons” who the officer
knew from his previous experiences were narcotics addicts.92 The officer then observed the defendant enter a restaurant, at which point
the officer approached the defendant and told him to come outside.93
The officer then said to the defendant, “You know what I am after.”94
The officer testified that the defendant “mumbled something and
reached into his pocket.”95 At the same time, the officer “thrust his
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Police Right to “Stop and Frisk,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 178, 178 (1968) [hereinafter Police
Right].
88
See supra section IV.A.
89
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67-68 (1968).
90
Id. (reversing in part, but failing to declare the stop and frisk law unconstitutional).
91
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 543-44.
92
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
84
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hand into the same pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes,
which, it turned out, contained heroin.”96
In Peters, an off duty officer, who was in his apartment that
he had lived in for the past twelve years, heard a noise at his door.97
When the officer looked through his peephole, he observed two men
tiptoeing away from the alcove toward a stairway.98 After calling the
police, the officer, in regular clothing, gave chase.99 The officer subsequently apprehended the defendant.100 After patting down the defendant for weapons, the officer “discovered a hard object in his
pocket.”101 When he removed the object, he found an envelope containing burglar’s tools.102 Both Sibron and Peters were convicted.103
The Supreme Court, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, reversed Sibron’s conviction, finding that the officer lacked “probable
cause to make an arrest” and that the frisk violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights because the officer “did not have sufficient
facts to warrant a belief that [the defendant] was armed and dangerous.”104 Significantly, the Court did not invalidate the officer’s stop
of the defendant, only the subsequent arrest.105 The Court upheld the
conviction in Peters, finding that the officer had probable cause to
believe that a crime had been committed.106
Although the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in
Sibron, it did so by applying only the Fourth Amendment.107 The
Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the state stop and
frisk law.108 However, because the Supreme Court found that the
stops “did not violate [the defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights, the
Court effectively ruled that the law [wa]s not facially unconstitutional
while leaving room to find it unconstitutionally applied in individual
instances.”109
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 44.
Police Right, supra note 87, at 180-81.
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544-45.
Police Right, supra note 87, at 181.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544.
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People v. De Bour: Clarifying Street
Encounters

In 1976, the Court of Appeals, recognizing a level of police
intrusion less invasive than an arrest requiring probable cause,110 attempted to clarify the controversial stop and frisk law by putting into
place a four-tier standard for determining if and when an officer can
approach, inquire, ask accusatory questions, detain, frisk, and make
an arrest.111 The court developed each tier by evaluating the Supreme
Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio112 and by balancing two of society’s
competing interests: “ ‘the interest of individuals in living their lives
free from governmental interference’ and the ‘nondelegable duty
placed squarely on the shoulders of law enforcement officers to make
the streets reasonably safe for us all.’ ”113
As previously discussed in this note, in Terry, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment not only applies to arrests, but also to a lower level of police intrusion: the stop and
frisk.114 Put more clearly, “the police can stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be
afoot’ even if the officer lacks probable cause” under the Fourth
Amendment.115
As a result of Terry, many have wondered if lower levels of
intrusions, such as an “officer’s offer of assistance or initial approach
and questioning of a citizen about his presence in an area” were subject to constitutional challenges, and if so, what was required before
officers could engage in these non-forcible stops.116 The Court of
Appeals provided an answer in De Bour.
i.

The Four Level Standard

The first level, the request for information, is the most flexible

110

Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV 512, 515 (1991).
111
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544-45.
112
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 575.
113
Sack, supra note 110, at 512-13.
114
See supra section IV.A; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
115
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
116
Sack, supra note 110, at 515.
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standard.117 An officer is permitted to approach and request information when “there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality.”118 The first level
was based on the belief that the interest of the police, “their public
service functions” to make and keep the streets reasonably safe, was
of crucial importance.119 It was further framed around the general
right to “approach any other person and attempt to strike up a conversation.”120
The second level, the common law right to inquire, as its
name indicates, was recognized by the Court of Appeals prior to its
decision in De Bour.121 “[A] policeman is entitled to interfere with a
citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information”122
when there is a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”123
Absent from this level of intrusion is a forcible seizure.124 A forcible
seizure occurs when an officer confronts an individual and deprives
him of his ability to walk away.125 The common law right of inquiry
was recognized and developed because the court believed that
“commonsense”126 and the overall issue of whether an officer’s actions were reasonable demanded a level of inquiry that fell between
the first level’s limited right to approach and the third level’s right to
seize.127
The third level, stop and frisk, is a result of New York’s stop
and frisk statute.128 “Where a police officer entertains a reasonable
suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing or is
about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, the C[riminal ]P[rocedure
]L[aw] authorizes a forcible stop and detention of that person.”129
With the officer’s right to forcibly stop and detain a person comes the
117
Gennaro Savastano, Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Moore, 23 TOURO L.
REV. 323, 327 (2007).
118
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
119
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 545.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
126
David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 119 (2013).
127
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 545-46.
128
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
129
Id.
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right to frisk, but only “if the officer reasonably suspects that he is in
danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee being armed.”130
The fourth level, the power to arrest, is based on “probable
cause.”131 An officer has the authority to make an arrest only when
probable cause leads him to believe that a “person has committed a
crime, or offense in his presence”; “probable cause” arises when the
officer has knowledge of “facts and circumstances” that “warrant a
prudent person” to believe the suspect is about to, is currently, or has
committed an offense.132
B.

Bolstering the Court’s Decision in People v. Loretta

The court’s decision in Loretta lacks detail. While the court
was clear in its conclusion, its basis is confined to only a few sentences.133 Specifically, the court’s decision lacks clear reasoning as
to why the defendant’s conduct constituted a level-two, as opposed to
a level-three encounter, and why the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant.134 The court likely found that the officers’ conduct constituted a level-two encounter because reasonable suspicion
cannot be generated based on “[i]nnocuous, or even equivocal behavior.”135 Nervous characteristics, as the defendant in Loretta displayed, are common when dealing with the police. Therefore, the
court could have viewed the defendant’s conduct as “innocuous” and
concluded that reasonable suspicion did not arise.136
In New York, the First Department has ruled that an officer’s
suspicion that a defendant’s bag contains drugs is worthy of a leveltwo encounter.137 Furthermore, select New York courts have stated
that a “tinfoil packet . . . may be deemed a ‘hallmark’ rather than
merely a ‘telltale sign’ of criminal drug activity.”138 Specifically, the
First Department has held that when an officer observes a defendant
with a tinfoil packet, he has probable cause to arrest him.139
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id.; Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
Id. at 1.
31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Procedure § 135 (2013).
Id.
People v. Stevenson, 867 N.Y.S.2d 56 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013).
People v. Alexander, 640 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996).
People v. Scott-Heron, 783 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004).
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NEW YORK’S STOP AND FRISK LAW: RACIAL PROFILING
A.

Evidence of Racial Profiling?

In 1999, Amadou Diallo, an African immigrant, was shot forty-one times by four plain-clothed police officers.140 The officers,
who were white, approached Diallo because they “believed that he fit
the description of a rapist.”141 The officers shot at Diallo after he
reached for his wallet.142
All four of the officers were acquitted, and in response to public backlash, then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer prepared a report
documenting the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) stop and
frisk practices in the context of racial profiling.143 The report, which
analyzed stops that occurred in 1998 and 1999, found “that blacks
were more than six times more likely to be stopped than whites, and
Hispanics were more than four times more likely to be stopped than
whites.”144
As Spitzer’s report made clear, a higher rate of minority stops
did not always demonstrate racial bias.145 This is especially evident
when some data show that minorities commit crimes more often.146
However, the report further clarified that the correlation could not
solely be explained by higher crime rates by minorities.147 Using regression analysis, the report concluded, “blacks and Hispanics were
significantly more likely than whites to be ‘stopped’ after controlling
for race-specific precinct crime rates and precinct population composition by race.”148
In 2006, the NYPD hired Research and Development
(“RAND”) in response to data that indicated 89% of stops involved
140

Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 560.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 561.
144
Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs Linger,
but How Far Can the Police Go?, 72-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 42 (2000).
145
The New York City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the
People of the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General, NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 93 (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/
default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf. [hereinafter Stop and Frisk Practices: A
Report].
146
Id. at ix.
147
Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 562.
148
See Stop and Frisk Practices: A Report, supra note 145, at 121.
141
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nonwhites.149 RAND is a “nonprofit institution that helps improve
policy and decision making through research and analysis.”150
RAND was hired to determine “first, whether [the data] point[ed] to
racial bias in police officers’ decisions to stop particular pedestrians,
and, further, whether [the data] indicate[d] that officers are particularly intrusive when stopping nonwhites.”151
RAND’s external-benchmarking analysis determined that
“black pedestrians were stopped at a rate that [wa]s 20 to 30 percent
lower than their representation in crime-suspect descriptions. Hispanic pedestrians were stopped disproportionately more, by 5 to 10
percent, than their representation among crime-suspect descriptions
would predict.”152 Applying its least reliable benchmark test, RAND
found “[b]lack pedestrians were stopped at a rate that [wa]s 50 percent greater than their representation in the residential census. The
stop rate for Hispanic pedestrians equaled their residential census
representation.”153
RAND, however, warned that statistical analyses often “exaggerate racial disparities.”154 As a final conclusion, RAND found
that its analysis did not eliminate racial disparities, but did indicate
that the disparities are far lower than the raw data suggested.155
B.

Current Challenges to New York’s Stop and Frisk
Law

In 2011, plaintiffs David Floyd and David Ourlicht brought a
class action lawsuit against the City of New York, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and New York
City Police Officers, “alleging that defendants h[ad] implemented
and sanctioned a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional
stops and frisks by the NYPD on the basis of race and/or national

149

Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police Department’s
Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND.ORG xi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p
ubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR534.sum.pdf (last visited May 2, 2014).
150
About the RAND Corporation, RAND.ORG, http://www.rand.org/about.html (last visited May 2, 2014).
151
Ridgeway, supra note 149.
152
Id. at xii.
153
Id. at xi.
154
Id. at xiv.
155
Id. at xi.
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origin.”156
In February of 2008, David Floyd, an African-American man,
testified that while walking in his neighborhood, he passed a man,
who Floyd believed was locked out of his home.157 The man was also African-American.158 Floyd’s godmother owned the building, and
as a result, Floyd was able to go upstairs and receive between seven
and ten keys, which would potentially unlock the door and give the
man access to his home.159 Before Floyd could open the door, three
NYPD officers approached Floyd and the tenant.160 The officers
asked Floyd and the tenant “what they were doing, told them to stop,”
and subsequently frisked them.161 All three officers testified that they
believed Floyd was committing a burglary.162
Approximately five months later, in June of 2008, David
Ourlicht, an African-American man, was approached and searched by
more than four police officers, after they had received a report of a
man with a gun in the area.163 Ourlicht had been sitting outside of a
housing project in Harlem, New York.164 When the officers finished
searching the housing project, they approached Ourlicht and forced
him to lie on the ground.165 After Ourlicht had been lying on the
ground for close to ten minutes, the officers asked him and the other
men he was with for their names and identification.166 The NYPD
was not able to present any evidence that the police received a call or
report of a gun in the area.167 Nor was a gun ever recovered.168
Ourlicht further alleged that all of the officers on the scene were
white males.169
Judge Scheindlin held, in regard to the February 2008 incident, that “the officers were justified in their reasonable suspicion” to
156
Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), on
reconsideration, 813 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
157
Id. at 424.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
162
Id. at 424-25.
163
Id. at 427.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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search Floyd.170 Scheindlin believed that the combination of the officers’ awareness of a “midday burglary pattern in the neighborhood,” and Floyd and the tenant’s nervous mannerisms “create[d]
enough reasonable suspicion to justify the officers briefly detaining
the men for an investigatory stop.”171 Furthermore, the frisk was justified because the officers had suspected the two men of committing
the crime of burglary.172 The frisk was also necessary to protect the
safety of the officers.173
Following this decision, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate Floyd’s claims arising out of his February 2008 stop and frisk.174
The motion was a result of new evidence put forward by the plaintiff
that challenged the existence of a burglary pattern.175 The court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate Floyd’s claim, holding that
the existence of a burglary pattern was a genuine issue of material
fact.176 The court further denied the defendants’ argument that even
in the absence of a burglary pattern, “the officers nonetheless had
reasonable suspicion to stop Floyd.”177
In regard to the June 2008 incident, Judge Scheindlin denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.178 Judge Scheindlin
held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that officers must have
reasonable individualized articulable suspicion that an individual is
armed and dangerous before frisking him.”179 A general report of a
gun, Judge Scheindlin stated, did not support reasonable individualized articulable suspicion “to stop and frisk any individual in the area.”180
In August of 2013, approximately five years after the February and June incidents, Judge Scheindlin declared New York’s stop
and frisk policy unconstitutional because it violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.181 Scheindlin found that individuals were
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 443.
Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), ap-
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stopped because of their race and without any reasonable suspicion as
required by Terry v. Ohio.182 These determinations were made from
a statistical analysis of close to 4.5 million stops in New York City
from 2004 to 2012.183
In November of 2013, the United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, was forced to reassign the case to a different district
court judge.184 This decision was made after Judge Scheindlin made
statements that the court believed compromised her impartiality.185
Following the case’s reassignment, the City of New York filed a motion seeking to vacate Scheindlin’s decision in August of 2013.186
This motion was denied.187
Bill de Blasio, the current democratic mayor of New York
City, who assumed office in January of 2014, stated during his campaign, “he would drop objections to the decision, which had called
for a monitor to oversee major changes to the police tactic.”188 However, in late December of 2013, de Blasio gave a scare to stop and
frisk opposition activists when he appointed Bill Bratton, a stop and
frisk supporter,189 as the new police commissioner.190 Feeling the
heat, NYPD Union lawyers, in January of 2014, filed legal papers requesting that the Court of Appeals speed up its determination as to
peal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013).
182
Vidisha Barua Worley, Terry Stops: Reasonable Suspicion or Just a Hunch?, 49 CRIM.
L. BULL. 10 (2013).
183
Rudovsky, supra note 126, at 118.
184
Ligon v. City of New York (Ligon I), 736 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2013).
185
Id. In a proceeding involving another case, Scheindlin stated, “if you got proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit?
You can certainly mark it as related.” Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101, 103
n.1 (2d Cir. 2013), superseded in part, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, No. 133123-CV, 2014 WL 667358 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2014). She also added, “[w]hat I am trying to
say, I am sure I am going to get in trouble for saying it, for $65 you can bring that lawsuit.”
Id. She later continued, “[a]nd as I said before, I would accept it as a related case, which the
plaintiff has the power to designate.” Id.
186
Ligon v. City of New York (Ligon II), 736 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2013).
187
Id.
188
Colleen Long & Larry Neumeister, NYC’s Appeal of Stop-And-Frisk Ruling Could Be
Dropped If De Blasio Elected Mayor, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:32 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/01/stop-and-frisk-appeal-de-blasio_n_4189961.html.
189
Saki Knafo, Bill Bratton, Stop-And-Frisk Architect, Takes Over Nation's Biggest Police Force, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
4/01/02/bill-bratton-sworn-in_n_4533202.html.
190
David Goodman, Bratton to Lead New York Police for Second Time, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/nyregion/william-bratton-new-york-citypolice-commissioner.html.
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whether Scheindlin’s controversial decision would be struck down as
a result of partiality.191
In late January of 2014, one month into his term as mayor of
New York City, de Blasio agreed to withdraw the city’s appeal of the
Second Circuit’s controversial decision.192 As required by the Second Circuit, de Blasio agreed to the appointment of a monitor to
foresee the necessary steps to end stop and frisk related discrimination.193 The withdrawal was part of the mayor’s “collective commitment to fix the fundamental problems that enabled stop-and-frisk to
grow out of control and violate the rights of innocent New Yorkers.”194 It has yet to be seen if de Blasio will simply adhere to the Second Circuit’s prescription or whether he will embrace the court’s
decision and take further steps that may help to put an end to discriminatory police practices.195 For now, however, de Blasio must cope
with five police unions, including the “Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association and unions representing sergeants, captains, detectives and
lieutenants,” which have asked the Second Circuit to prevent withdrawal of the appeal.196 The unions argued that the decision “would
unfairly taint the integrity of the police force and re-write rules governing officer conduct.”197
VII.

CONCLUSION

While the federal and state approaches used to determine the
justification for police conduct vary, both are used to ensure the safe191

Rich Calder, NYPD union lawyers seek quicker stop-frisk appeal ruling, N.Y. POST
(Jan. 2, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/01/02/nypd-union-lawyers-seek-quickerstop-frisk-appeal-ruling/.
192
Stop-And-Frisk Appeal Dropped By Mayor De Blasio, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31,
2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/stop-and-frisk-appeal-droppedmayor-de-blasio_n_4695930.html.
193
Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on
Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/ny
region/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
John Riley, Police unions act to pursue stop-and-frisk appeal, NEWSDAY (Feb. 7, 2014,
3:48 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/police-unions-act-to-pursue-stop-and-friskappeal-1.6981485.
197
NYC Police Unions File Motion To Intervene In Stop-And-Frisk Dispute: Unions Want
To Continue Litigation If City Drops Appeal, CBS NEW YORK (Nov. 7, 2013, 1:07 PM),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/11/07/nyc-police-unions-file-motion-to-intervene-in-stopand-frisk-dispute/.
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ty of police officers. Furthermore, both standards appropriately balance the fundamental right of privacy with the necessary actions a
police officer must take to protect and promote the safety of those
they vowed to serve and protect. Although at times, issues arise regarding the constitutionality of some of the methods applied by various departments, cities, and states, an arbitrary line has to be drawn
somewhere in order to efficiently balance both the privacy concerns
of persons and the safety concerns of police officers.
Corey Rashkover
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